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Non-technical summary 
 
In this study, we analyze the effects of individual and firm characteristics on job 
durations using censored quantile regression.  We argue that censored quantile 
regression provides a better empirical framework for estimating the determinants 
of job durations than conventional hazard rate analysis in many cases.  The main 
advantage of censored quantile regression is that the determinants of mobility are 
allowed to differ according to the position in the duration distribution.  
Therefore, quantile regression is an appropriate way to test the conjecture that 
‘particular demographic characteristics are more important early in a job than 
later or vice versa’ (Farber, 1994: 574).  We use this fact to investigate whether 
we can differentiate between approaches such as search and job matching theory, 
human capital theory and dual labor markets. 
According to the job matching theory, the quality of an employment 
relationship is seen as an experience good.  It is unknown at the start of the 
employment spell and is only revealed after the worker has been employed for 
some time, resulting in separations from the firm.  Alternatively, human capital 
theory posits that specific human capital accumulated on the job creates match-
specific rents which provide a disincentive to mobility.  According to dual labor 
market theory, institutions such as employment protection enhance segmentation 
between long-term and short-term employment relationships.   Overall, our 
findings provide some support for job matching and dual labor market theory 
while less evidence is found for effects of specific human capital.   
Among the results, firm-specific coefficients vary markedly with 
seniority.  Person-specific coefficients of variables such as age and education 
have reasonable magnitudes and are often constant over the duration distribution.  
The impact of a works council on job durations is high and significant as 
expected.  It unfolds relatively slowly over the employment spell, suggesting that 
works councils’ activities are targeted at workers with high seniority.  
Unexpectedly, the share of fixed-term contracts has a positive but decreasing 
impact on job durations.  We also include wages, measured at the start of the 
employment spell.  As expected from search theory, job durations are increasing 
monotonically with wages.  However, the effect is strongly decreasing over the 
duration for high wage categories.  This may be explained by the fact that wage 
gains on the job may differ much among workers with high entry wages, 
depending on whether workers are successful and offered promotion.  Hence, the 
relevance of entry wages for mobility fades out gradually over time. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Data on job mobility and employment durations reflect a variety of different 
economic processes. Approaches like search theory, job matching theory, human 
capital theory and dual labor market theory all explain important and distinct 
aspects of job mobility. However, it is difficult to derive predictions that allow 
one to separate the theories empirically.  For instance, according to all of these 
approaches, the separation probability is expected to be high at the beginning of a 
spell and to decrease with employment duration.  Similarly, both job matching 
theory and human capital theory predict highly skilled workers to have longer job 
durations.  Using methods such as proportional hazard models, it is difficult to 
assess the empirical validity of each of these theoretical approaches.1   
 In this paper, we argue that censored quantile regression provides a better 
empirical framework for estimating the determinants of job durations than 
conventional hazard rate analysis in many cases and is helpful to overcome some 
of the difficulties just mentioned.  The main advantage of censored quantile 
regression is that the determinants of mobility are allowed to differ according to 
the position in the duration distribution.  Therefore, quantile regression is an 
appropriate way to test the conjecture that ‘particular demographic characteristics 
are more important early in a job than later or vice versa’ (Farber, 1994: 574).  
Moreover, while different theories often do not differ in their predictions with 
respect to the average effect of covariates on the probability of exit, they 
sometimes differ markedly with respect to relative effects at different job 
durations.  For instance, if the accumulation of specific human capital proceeds 
slowly, the effect of variables relating to specific human capital is likely to be 
stronger later than earlier in the employment spell.  According to job matching, 
by contrast, any uncertainty relating to the quality of the match will gradually 
disappear.  Hence, uncertainty should no longer explain dissolutions of long-
standing employment relationships.   
 Another advantage of applying quantile regression is that effects of labor 
market institutions can be uncovered in more detail than otherwise possible.  
Firm-level institutions such as firing rules, employee representation and firm-
specific training programs may protect workers from dismissal or make job 
changes less valuable after some time in the employment spell.  However, they 
                                              
1  There are some attempts to estimate structural models derived from specific human capital and 
matching theory, such as Nagypál (2006).  This approach is a useful complement to the non-structural 
approach taken in our paper.  
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may not inhibit probation and sorting and, therefore, may have little effect on job 
stability within the first months of the employment relationship.  Similarly, 
certain personnel policies such as the use of fixed-term contracts may increase 
mobility initially but may stabilize employment among those matches that have 
‘survived’ the sorting process.   
 Quantile regressions have often been used by researchers analyzing 
unemployment durations (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006; Koenker and Bilias, 
2001; Machado and Portugal, 2002).  To our knowledge, however, Horowitz and 
Neumann (1987) is the only study in which employment durations have been 
estimated using quantile regression.  A particular problem for estimating job 
durations – as opposed to unemployment durations – is that many spells are long-
lasting, so that the degree of censoring is high.  Using data for a period of seven 
years, the proportion of censored spells is about 45 per cent in our case.  
Nevertheless, we find that numerical problems are not prohibitive.  A drawback 
of the methodology is that we cannot use information on time-varying influences 
on job durations.  This precludes us from investigating hypotheses that rest on 
changes in observable quantities, such as the effect of current wages on job 
durations. 
 Most studies analyzing job mobility use either firm-level data or worker-
level data with limited information on the firm side.  In this paper, we use a 
matched employer-employee dataset with particularly rich information on firm-
level characteristics.  Furthermore, the data allows us to generate a flow sample 
which avoids biases due to left censoring.  At the worker level, job durations 
have been analyzed using techniques such as linear regression on the stock of job 
durations (Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Gerlach and Stephan, 2005; Mumford 
and Smith, 2004) or, more appropriately, duration analysis based on inflows into 
employment (Abowd et al., 2006; Boockmann and Steffes; 2005; Dohmen and 
Pfann, 2004; Dostie, 2005).  All of these approaches do not allow for changes in 
the effects of the covariates on job durations. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, 
we elaborate on the idea that the relative importance of different theories and 
institutions changes over the employment spell, and propose a number of testable 
predictions.  In section 3, we introduce our data.  Section 4 contains the 
methodology, while empirical results are presented in section 5.  In the 
concluding remarks, we summarize the main implications of our findings.   
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2 Hypotheses on the determinants of employment durations 
 
In this section, we show that there are strong reasons why the determinants of job 
exit may differ across the distribution of job durations.  We highlight that the 
different theoretical accounts of the mobility process all imply that the effects of 
the determinants of mobility change with job durations, so that the use of 
quantile regression is required.  Moreover, the predictions differ in important 
respects.  This enhances the opportunities to empirically distinguish between 
different theoretical approaches.  Table 1 summarizes our expectations about the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 1: Expectations about effects of covariates 
 
Matching 
theory 
Search theory 
Human Capital 
theory 
Dual labour 
markets 
Firm-Size + ↓  + ↑  
Investments in ICT - ↓  + ↑ or 0 →  
Further Training   + ↑  
Education + ↓  + ↑  
Job position + ↓  + ↑  
Age + ↓  – ↑  
Job-to-job change + ↓    
Unemployed/out-of-
labor 
– ↓ 
 
 
 
Recall + ↓  + ↓  
Entry wage + ↓ (low q.)   + → + ↑  
Share of FTC  
 
 
– ↓ (low q.)  
 + → (high q.) 
Works council    + ↑ 
Note: + positive effect, – negative effect, ↑ increasing over duration, ↓ decreasing over duration,  
→ constant over duration. 
 
Job matching 
In the case of job matching theory, the quality of the match between worker and 
employer is seen as an experience good (Jovanovic, 1979a; Mortensen, 1988).  It 
is unknown at the start of the employment spell and is only revealed after the 
worker has been employed for some time.  If the expected quality of the match 
falls below a reservation level, the match is dissolved.  Hence, the number of 
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separations (both quits and layoffs2) reflects the degree of initial mismatch in 
new hirings.  If there are costs to mobility, the number of separations changes in 
a hump-shaped fashion over time (Farber, 1994).  Initially, few jobs are ended 
since little information has been gained.  At long durations, all bad matches have 
been terminated.  Most sorting activity takes place at intermediate durations.   
 According to matching theory, we expect that employer and worker 
characteristics influencing the amount of initial mismatch have relatively large 
effects at the beginning of the relationship but have no effects later in the 
employment spell.   Some firm characteristics may have a systematic influence 
on the uncertainty attached to the quality of the match at the moment when the 
employment contract is signed and, hence, on subsequent job mobility.3  For 
instance, personnel policies of large firms are often known to job applicants, 
while those of small firms are often unknown to outsiders.  Consequently, one 
expects a higher degree of mismatch in the latter.  Similarly, in firms having 
introduced new technologies, uncertainty about the kind of workers required is 
higher than elsewhere and sorting may be more intense.  
 Matching theory also has interesting implications for the effects of 
individual characteristics.  In the case of young workers, less information is 
available on their ability for certain kinds of work.  Hence, low age is expected to 
have a larger influence early in the employment spell than later, when the 
uncertainty has been resolved.4  A similar argument applies for persons who have 
been unemployed or out of the labor force for some time (Arranz and García-
Serrano, 2004).  By contrast, in case of persons who had been previously 
employed by the same employer, the quality of the match should be known and, 
hence, job matching theory predicts a positive (but decreasing) coefficient.  
Lastly, it can be shown in a matching model that high-skilled workers and those 
in higher job positions have lower exit rates initially in the employment spell 
because they sustain a bad match longer than others.  The reason is that their 
opportunity costs are higher and, therefore, they try to avoid periods of 
unemployment (Moscarini, 2003).  The argument becomes less relevant later in 
the employment spell, so that an effect of skills should mainly be found at lower 
durations. 
                                              
2  Jovanovic (1979a) considers only the case of quits but the argument can be generalized to the case of 
both quits and layoffs. 
3  Clearly, companies’ and workers’ decisions as to whether to conclude employment relationships with 
high inherent risks are endogenous.  To the extent that variables like employment history are 
included, however, we capture some of the unobserved inherent riskiness of hirings. 
4  This view is related to the job-shopping argument (Johnson, 1978). 
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Specific human capital 
To the extent that specific human capital accumulated on the job is not 
transferable across employers, match-specific rents are created which provide a 
disincentive to mobility.  Since this effect rises with the stock of human capital, 
mobility decreases over the employment spell (Becker, 1993; Jovanovic, 1979b).  
In contrast to matching theory, all variables that capture match-specific rents 
should display a quantitatively more pronounced impact at higher quantiles of the 
duration distribution.  For instance, if match-specific human capital and formal 
education or job-related training are complementary, we expect a positive effect 
of education or training on job durations that is increasing with job tenure.5     
At the level of the firm, the use of certain skill-intensive technologies and 
the provision of firm-financed further training should positively influence the 
amount of job-specific human capital.  Investments into further training paid by 
the employer are generally firm-specific and should, therefore, lead to longer job 
durations (Becker, 1993; Lazear, 2003).  Investments into information and 
communication technology (ICT) are often followed by the need of special 
training for the employees who work with the new system. If the technology is 
firm-specific the effect of investments in ICT is expected to increase with job 
duration. If not, the special training is an investment in general human capital and 
there should be no relationship with tenure. 
 On the basis of human capital theory, we expect durations to decline 
ceteris paribus with age at the start of the job.  The reason is that employers and 
employees only invest in firm-specific human capital if they expect that the 
relationship will continue for some time.  Moreover, it may be more difficult for 
older employees to accumulate human capital because the ability to absorb new 
information declines with age.  As far as job-specific human capital is 
considered, the worker’s employment history should not be important for job exit 
according to human capital theory.  The only origin state which should affect 
tenure is an employment spell in the current firm.  If recalled, the employee 
already possesses knowledge of firm-specific technical and organizational 
processes and, hence, starts with a positive amount of match-specific rents.  To 
the extent that new employees catch up with this initial advantage, the positive 
                                              
5  Due to the concavity of human capital accumulation commonly assumed in the literature, the strength 
of the effect is expected to decrease towards the end of the duration distribution.  Given that we 
observe individuals at most over seven years, however, it is unlikely that we find strong evidence for 
decreasing marginal effects of education in our data. 
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effect on duration is bound to decrease over time.6  This prediction is similar to 
the prediction of a matching model. 
  
Search theory and the role of wages 
According to search theory, tenure is expected to increase with wages (see, e.g., 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).  In the simplest case, workers obtaining wage 
offers from other employers will leave their current job if the outside wage is 
higher than the current wage.  Thus, wages are a crucial variable for the 
determination of job durations.  An important issue for specification is to which 
amount tenure is due to wage gains received during the current employment spell 
or due to the employer paying higher wages at all durations.  In the former case, 
tenure depends on the current wage, while in the latter case it depends on the 
initial wage in the job.   
 While quantile regression cannot account for wage changes in the job, it is 
possible to analyze changes in the effect of entry wages over the duration of the 
employment contract.  An impact of entry wages at the beginning of the job 
could easily be explained by search theory.  If we find a significant effect at 
higher quantiles, this could be explained by search theory if current and entry 
wages are correlated.  However, we would expect the effect to weaken with 
duration. 
 There is a well-known endogeneity problem with respect to wages in a 
tenure equation (Abowd et al., 2006; Altonji and Williams, 2005).  According to 
human capital theory, the worker accumulates firm-specific human capital over 
time.  Hence, wages depend positively on tenure (reversed causation).  Therefore, 
the wage is excluded in some analyzes of job durations (e.g. Gerlach and 
Stephan, 2005; Mumford and Smith, 2004) or the endogeneity problem is not 
accounted for (e.g. Dohmen and Pfann, 2004).  Some studies solve this problem 
using simultaneous or two-step estimation (e.g., Abowd et al., 2006).  
Unfortunately one cannot apply these techniques in censored quantile regression.  
Clearly, the exclusion potentially creates omitted variable bias if the wage is 
correlated with other observed or unobserved characteristics, such as 
productivity. While reversed causation is more relevant to current wages than for 
initial wages, job durations and entry wages could be linked due to unobserved 
characteristics.  For instance, entry wages may proxy for certain skills that may 
                                              
6  Firm-specific human capital can be depreciated during the non-working period.  Because we only 
define employment spells as recalls in cases where the last employment spell has been with the same 
employer, depreciation should not have a great influence in our case. 
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also cause employer-employee matches to be more durable.  Our strategy is to 
estimate specifications with and without wages. While the effect of wages on 
tenure must be interpreted with great care, it is instructive to see whether the 
coefficients of the other independent variables are sensitive with respect to the 
potential omitted variable and endogeneity biases.  
 
Institutions and dual labor markets 
There is strong empirical evidence that employment protection increases job 
stability (Gerlach and Stephan, 2005; Kugler and Pica, 2003).  However, 
employment protection often becomes effective only after a certain amount of 
time, e.g. after a probation period.  In the German case, tenure also increases 
employment protection because it is one of the criteria used by labor courts to 
judge whether a dismissal is ‘socially justified’.  Employment protection is often 
limited by the use of fixed-term contracts.  Workers on fixed-term contracts are 
more likely to exit under two conditions: either the nature of the job or the 
companies’ need for additional workers is temporary or fixed-term contracts are 
used as screening devices.  On the basis of the screening mechanism, we expect 
to observe higher exit rates at lower quantiles and lower exit rates at higher 
quantiles in firms offering fixed-term contracts (Boockmann and Hagen, 2005; 
Capelli and Neumark, 2001).  Fixed-term contracts could also be used to stabilize 
employment and insulate long-term workers from short-term adjustment needs.   
There also exists, however, a reason why the use of fixed-term contracts 
may initially enhance job stability.  According to the German labor law, 
separations before the expiry of a fixed-term contract are usually only possible by 
mutual agreement.  Thus, it is often impossible for employers to dismiss fixed-
term workers. Unfortunately, we do not observe the individual type of contract 
but only the proportion of workers having a fixed-term contract. 
Another institution, apart from employment protection, that is often 
believed to increase job stability is works councils.  One reason is that they may 
have a role in individual dismissals and redundancy procedures and may, thus, 
slow down separation decisions.  Another is that works councils have a ‘voice’ 
function, making companies more attractive to the workforce and thus reducing 
voluntary quits (Frick and Möller, 2003).  In either case, if works councils are 
dominated by ‘insiders’ with high job tenure, it is likely that their effect is 
concentrated on this constituency, while the effect is less present for workers 
with low tenure who, for various reasons, have less influence on the decisions of 
works councils (Boockmann and Hagen, 2003). Therefore, the effect of works 
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councils should increase over the duration distribution. In all of these cases, 
institutions create segmentation among companies’ workforces into short-term 
and unstable employment on the one hand, and protected or voluntarily long-
term employment, on the other. 
 
 
3 Data and descriptive statistics  
 
The database used in this study is the German LIAB, a linked employer-
employee dataset provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) of the 
Federal Employment Agency.7 The LIAB combines administrative data on 
employees with employer data from a large-scale representative survey of plants, 
the IAB Establishment Panel.  This annual survey contains data on 16,000 
establishments.  The LIAB is exhaustive on the number of workers covered 
within the establishment sample.  The employee part of the LIAB is the 
Employment Statistics Register (Beschäftigtenstatistik) of the Federal 
Employment Agency (Bender and Haas, 2002).  The establishment part – the 
IAB-Establishment Panel – is a representative annual survey of establishments 
(Kölling, 2000).   
 The longitudinal version of the LIAB currently contains establishments 
with interviews from 1993 to 2002.  However, information on all workers in 
these establishments is available only from 1996, while worker information for 
previous years is limited to those workers still employed by the survey 
establishments in 1996.  In order to avoid sampling from a stock of workers, we 
restrict ourselves to workers having started their employment spells in the survey 
establishments after 1996.  Furthermore, in order to restrict the amount of right-
censoring, we only consider entries until the end of 1997.  
We define an employment spell as the period from the beginning until the 
end of an employment relationship with a particular employer.  The end of an 
employment spell is assumed if two conditions apply.  First, the individual is 
observed to move into unemployment or non-employment or is hired by a new 
employer.  Second, the current employer reports the end of the employment 
relationship to the insurance institution.8 A change of the employer identifier 
                                              
7  The data source is discussed in greater detail in Alda et al. (2005).  The dataset used for estimations is 
discussed more closely in Boockmann and Steffes (2005).   
8  However, in case of exit to unemployment we do not require that the end of the employment 
relationship is reported by the employer. 
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alone is insufficient as a definition of a job exit. The reason is that a change of 
identifier may occur although the individual continues to work in the same 
workplace, e.g. if the legal identity of the employer or the owner of the 
establishment change.9 Hence, cases in which the end of the employment 
contract is not reported are treated as censored. 
 
Table 2: Definitions of destination and origin states 
Employment state Definition 
a) Destination states 
Unemployment worker receives unemployment benefits for at least one day within 60 days 
after separation, is not employed with current employer for at least 90 days 
after separation 
Non-employment 
 
worker is not employed with current employer for the next 90 days after 
separation, receives no unemployment benefits and does not change from 
job-to-job for at least 60 days after separation and has recorded end of 
relationship 
Job-to-job change worker takes up employment with another employer within 60 days after 
separation and has recorded end of relationship 
Recall worker takes up employment with the same employer after more than 90 
days after separation and has recorded end of relationship 
b) Origin states 
Unemployment worker received unemployment benefits for at least one day during 60 
days before hiring, was not employed with current employer for at least 90 
days before hiring 
Non-empl.  ≤ 1 year 
 
worker was not employed with current employer for at least 90 days 
before hiring, received no unemployment benefits for at least 60 days 
before hiring, did not change from job-to-job for at least 60 days before 
hiring, was observed in the year before hiring 
Non-empl.  > 1 year worker was not observed for at least 1 year before hiring 
Recall 
 
worker was employed with current employer for more than 90 days before 
hiring, previous spell ended with recorded end of relationship, received no 
unemployment benefits during 60 days before hiring, did not change from 
job-to-job during 60 days before employment 
Job-to-job change  worker did change from job-to-job at most 60 days before employment 
First employment worker not observed since January 1st, 1991, not older than 30 years at the 
first observed spell between 1996 and 2001  
 
The upper panel of table 2 briefly summarizes the definition of the 
destination states.  Episodes in which neither of these destination states can be 
                                              
9   In our data, this happens in a large number of cases.  Other studies based on similar data, such as 
Bellmann et al. (2000) and Bachmann (2005), rely solely on changes of the identifier and, therefore, 
have far less cases of censoring.   
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verified are taken as censored at the last observed employment record.  Recalls to 
the same employer within 90 days after the end of the previous spell are defined 
as uninterrupted employment. Recalls after that period are treated as a separate 
destination state if the end of the employment contract has been reported. More 
discussion on the definition of employment spells is contained in Boockmann 
and Steffes (2005). 
To determine the beginning of an employment spell, we proceed 
analogously, but we distinguish between short and long spells of previous non-
employment (see lower panel of table 2).  The former are defined as gaps of less 
than one year in a person’s employment history.  Furthermore, individuals below 
30 years of age starting their first spell in the data after 1996 and not observed 
between 1991 and 1995 form a separate category because these employees are 
likely to be observed in their first job. 
 If an individual is employed with more than one employer at the same 
time, we only use the employment spell generating the highest income.  Spells 
lasting only one day are dropped.  We restrict the data to male workers in West 
Germany aged 25 to 52.  The upper age limit is chosen in order to avoid 
confusion between job exit and early retirement.  The lower limit excludes 
students who may have short-term employment spells during school and 
university holidays.  In addition, we exclude employees working less than 15 
hours a week during the whole employment spell, apprentices and home workers.  
Spells in the agricultural sector are dropped due to its high rates of seasonal and 
temporary employment which mark out this sector from the rest of the economy.  
All spells with missing covariate information are also eliminated from the data.  
These requirements leave us with a sample of 31,941 employment spells, of 
which 44 per cent are censored.  Means and standard deviations of all covariates 
are presented in table A1 in the appendix. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the empirical survival function is drawn in 
figure 1.  The graph shows the unconditional quantiles at which the effects are 
estimated in the following.  For instance, the 0.1 quantile is at 65 days, the 0.2 
quantile at 178 days, and the 0.5 quantile (i.e., the median) is at 1307 days or 3.5 
years.  In figure 2 the hazard curve of our sample is shown.  Farber distinguishes 
between job matching and human capital theory on the basis of initial increase in 
the job exit probability, which is in line with matching but not with human 
capital accumulation.  In the graph, we do observe exactly this pattern since the 
hazard rate increases at the beginning and later on decreases again. 
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  Figure 1: Kaplan Meier graph 
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4 Estimation technique  
 
We use a censored quantile regression (CQR) approach to estimate establishment 
and individual effects on different quantiles of the job duration distribution.  
Compared to standard techniques such as the Cox proportional hazard model, the 
main advantage is that coefficients may vary over the duration distribution 
(Fitzenberger und Wilke, 2006; Koenker and Geling, 2001).  While quantile 
regression has been applied for a long time, the extension to censoring poses 
particular problems and has been developed only relatively recently (see 
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Fitzenberger, 1997). A drawback of using CQR is that only time-invariant 
covariates can be used.  Hence, the influence of the business cycle or current 
wages cannot be ascertained using this methodology.  Furthermore, in contrast to 
the proportional hazard model, the estimation of fixed firm effects is not possible 
using this model.10  
 We use a linear quantile regression for duration data based on the 
accelerated failure time model 
( ) ' ( ) ( )= β θ + ε θi i ih T x  (1)
where the θ -quantile of ( )iε θ conditional on ix  is zero and (.)h  is a strictly 
monotonic transformation of the completed duration iT  of the spell i .  The 
conditional quantile of model (1) can be written as  
( | ) ( ) ' ( )θ = β θh t x iQ x  (2)
For this kind of regression, several transformations can be chosen as long 
as they preserve the ordering of the quantiles (Fitzenberger et al., 2004). In this 
study, we use the log transformation:  
log( ) ( ) ' ( )θ = β θiT iQ x  (3)
Due to a high number of censored employment spells in our data, we have 
to apply CQR in order to get unbiased estimates.  This estimation method implies 
a strict demand on the structure of the data: the potential censoring point for 
uncensored data has to be known.  The observed completed duration is given by 
*               if spell is not censored
               if spell is censored     
i
i
i
T
T
C
⎧= ⎨⎩  
where *iT is the true duration and iC  is the observed duration if the true duration 
exceeds the observed duration.  Applying CQR requires that a potential iC  
should be defined even if the true duration is known.  In our case, it is natural to 
take the potential censoring point as the end of the observation period.  
Modifying model (3) by allowing for censoring yields 
                                              
10  In principle, one could estimate fixed firm effects including firm dummies.  However, due to the high 
number of firms in our sample, computational costs would be prohibitive in our case.  
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log( ) ( ) ' ( ) log( )iT i iQ x Cθ = β θ ∨  (4)
The coefficients are estimated by minimizing an objective function. It 
consists of a weighted sum of the distances between the true log durations and 
the minimum of the conditional quantile and the censored log durations: 
1
(log( ) min( ' ( ), log( )))
N
i i i
i
T x Cθ
=
ρ − β θ∑ , (5)
where N is the absolute number of employment spells and θρ  is the so-called 
check function ( ) ( ( 0))θρ = θ− <z z I z , with ( )I A  an indicator function equal to 
one if A is true. The check function weights the fitted values according to the 
quantile.11 Minimizing the distance function (5) yields the CQR estimator ˆ( )β θ .  
It can be shown that the estimator is N -consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed.  For a discussion of the asymptotic distribution, see Fitzenberger 
(1997). 
 Due to right-censoring, the distance function for CQR is not convex. 
Hence, the calculation of the estimator is numerically difficult.  Several 
procedures to calculate the estimator have been developed in the literature. They 
are compared by Fitzenberger and Winker (1999) with respect to their 
computational performance. These authors conclude that most of the algorithms 
encounter difficulties in case of a high censoring rate.  Therefore, we compared 
coefficients obtained using the algorithm developed by Buchinsky (1998) 
implemented in STATA and the one developed by Fitzenberger (1997) 
implemented in TSP.  Results were found to be numerically identical and thus we 
only present results from estimations with STATA.12  
The Buchinsky algorithm is an iterative procedure where only those 
observations are used in the next step whose fitted values are below the 
individual potential censoring point.  The process converges if all fitted values of 
the recent iteration step are below the censoring points.  If the process does not 
converge, the best iteration step with the smallest objective function is used for 
                                              
11  A quantile regression without censoring is a special case where = +∞iC . 
12  The data can only be accessed at the Research Data Centre of the Federal Employment Agency, 
which uses STATA as a standard statistical software.  Therefore, we first implemented the Buchinsky 
algorithm before comparing the results to those obtained using the Fitzenberger algorithm.  Results of 
the comparison can be delivered by the authors on request. 
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the final estimation.  Since standard errors may be biased, we use heteroscedastic 
robust estimates obtained by the pairwise bootstrap method (for details see Bilias 
et al., 2000).  Due to high censoring rates at the end of the distribution, we only 
estimate up to the 0.6-quantile.13 
 
 
5 Estimation results 
 
Results for estimations including the entry wage14 are reported in figure 3 (firm 
characteristics), figure 4 (individual characteristics) and figure 5 (wages).  The 
curves display per cent effects relative to a reference group.15  Individual 
coefficient estimates can be found in table A2 in the appendix.  Additional 
variables like collective bargaining structure, industry, nationality, country and 
year of hiring are included in the estimations but results are not shown in the 
graphs.  For the purpose of comparison, results for a specification without wages 
are included in table A3 in the appendix. 
 
The impact of firm characteristics 
Among firm characteristics, the effect of works councils is particularly 
interesting. At all quantiles, employees in firms with a works council experience 
significantly longer job durations.  Quantitatively, the effect is much stronger for 
long job durations. At the 0.6 quantile (i.e. for workers with approximately five 
years of job tenure), job durations are predicted to be 60 per cent higher in firms 
with works councils.  This suggests that the works councils’ activities are mainly 
targeted at high-seniority workers.  If wages are excluded, the effect of works 
councils is even higher, and the rising profile over quantiles is even more 
pronounced.  This indicates a positive correlation between works councils and 
entry wages over the whole duration distribution.  It suggests that, at least to 
some degree, the effect of works councils on durations is due to works councils’ 
effects on wages.  A question we cannot disentangle using our methodology is 
whether the increase in the effect of works councils is due to their impact on the 
                                              
13  When estimating higher quantiles, the number of cases in which the fitted values were higher than the 
potential censoring points was very high at all iteration steps. Therefore, the results are not displayed 
here. 
14  Since wages are right censored at the social security contribution ceiling in the data, we imputed 
censored wages according to the procedure by Gartner (2005).   
15  They are calculated as one minus the exponentiated coefficients.  
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wage trajectory in the job (Addison et al., 2006) or due to other mechanisms, 
such as improved working conditions or higher employment protection. 
 
Figure 3: Estimation results of firm characteristics (wages included) 
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Investments in information and communication technology (ICT) have a 
negative impact on long job durations. Coefficients are insignificant up to the 0.5 
quantile and are significantly negative at the 0.6 quantile. Without including the 
entry wage even the coefficient at the 0.5 quantile is negative. Therefore, the 
investments done by the firms we observe in the sample are not related to firm-
specific human capital. 
The use of fixed-term contracts is measured at the firm level as the share 
of fixed-term contracts in total employment in the establishment.  As mentioned 
earlier, individual contract status in not available in the LIAB.  The estimated 
impact of the share of fixed-term contracts is significantly positive at low 
quantiles but decreases over the quantiles. Quantitatively, a one percentage point 
increase in the share of fixed-term contracts is associated with a 1.6 per cent 
increase in job durations at the 0.1 quantile.  The fact that employment stability 
increases with the share of fixed term contract appears to be counter-intuitive at 
first sight.  In particular, it cannot be explained by the fact that long-lasting 
employment relationships are stabilized by the use of temporary work, because 
the effect is only present for short employment durations.  However, it is quite 
possible that the decreasing effect over quantiles could be due to the legal 
difficulty of dissolving a fixed-term contract prematurely.  Running a regression 
without wage information results in smaller estimated effects at all quantiles, 
indicating that the overall positive effect of fixed-term contracts is higher in low-
wage firms. 
Firm size is expected to have a positive influence on job durations.16  Our 
results show that in comparison to the reference group of small firms with less 
than 100 employees, large firms with more than 1000 employees exhibit 115 
percent longer job durations at the lowest quantiles.  However, the effect 
decreases with seniority and is actually negative after the 0.4 quantile.  At the 
highest observed quantile, the effect is about minus 60 percent.  A similar pattern 
is found for firms with 500 to 999 employees; here, the effect is insignificant for 
the 0.2 and 0.3 quantiles.  For firms with between 100 and 199 employees, 
employment durations are significantly shorter beyond the 0.2 quantile.  All other 
firm size dummies are more or less insignificant.  The effects are somewhat 
higher in estimations without wages.  These results indicate that the argument 
that internal labor markets stabilize employment in large firms needs to be 
                                              
16  The usual argument is that internal labor markets facilitate job changes within large firms.  However, 
Boockmann and Steffes (2005) find that the effect is small and does not increase monotonically with 
firm size.  Mumford and Smith (2004) even find no significant effects of workplace size. 
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qualified in two important respects.  First, it applies only to very large firms. 
Second, it is valid only for relatively short durations.  Overall, our findings are 
inconsistent with internal labor markets.  They are consistent with job matching 
theory if screening takes longer in larger firms due to particular difficulties in 
observing match quality if the number of workers is large. 
Job durations in firms providing further training are about 50 per cent 
higher than in other firms.  However, the effect becomes much smaller and 
statistically insignificant at the 0.5 quantile.17 In this sense, investments into 
further training have no long-run impact on job stability.  This finding contradicts 
the view that training facilitates the accumulation of specific human capital.  It is 
much more in line with matching theory.  Firms offering further training may 
also require a highly specialized workforce.  Separations may be more costly in 
this case, and it may take longer to complete the process of sorting of good and 
bad matches.     
 
The impact of individual characteristics  
As opposed to firm-level variables, the effects of individual characteristics are 
relatively constant over the job duration distribution.  Compared to the reference 
group of employees with vocational training, individuals who only had school 
education (either completed A-levels or below) have significantly shorter job 
durations.18  The effects, a 35 or 65 per cent reduction, respectively, remain 
roughly constant over the duration distribution.  Employees with university 
degree have lower job durations up to the fourth quantile, implying that high 
skilled male employees are more mobile than semi-skilled workers.  However, 
the effect is not present later in the employment spell.  The effect on university 
graduates is the only one which depends qualitatively on the inclusion or 
exclusion of entry wages.  If they are excluded, there is no significant influence 
of university education over the first five quantiles, while there is a significantly 
positive effect at the sixth quantile.  White collar and skilled blue collar workers 
have consistently higher job durations than unskilled blue collar workers.  In 
general, the inclusion of entry wages shifts the effects of education and job 
position more or less constantly over the tenure distribution.  This indicates that 
                                              
17  Estimations without entry wages produce similar results. 
18  An explanation for the finding for individuals with A-levels could be that these are students working 
during university holidays.  The same could hold for employees with vocational training and A-
levels, who also have lower job durations.  Although many of these cases should be excluded from 
the data by setting the lower age limit to 25, we cannot identify these employment relationships as 
long as they are covered by the social security system. 
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entry wages are a good proxy for general human capital to the extent that it is 
correlated with the skill level and the job position.  The fact that the effects of 
education or skills do not increase over the duration distribution may be 
interpreted as evidence against the specific human capital model, if skilled and 
better educated workers are in a better position than the unskilled to accumulate 
human capital. 
 
Figure 4: Estimation results of individual characteristics (wages included) 
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Figure 4 continued… 
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We expect young workers to exhibit shorter job durations according to a 
higher probability of initial mismatch.  This phenomenon should decrease with 
seniority.  According to the human capital view, we expect older workers to have 
shorter durations because building specific human capital pays less for them.  
This effect should be more marked the higher job durations.  The results show 
that age (measured at the beginning of the employment spell) increases job 
durations up to the age of 40 to 44.  From then, there is a slight decline in job 
stability.  In estimations without wages, the effects are a bit higher but the slopes 
are decreasing at higher quantiles.  The coefficients are quite similar between 
quantiles.  Taken together, there is only little evidence in favor of human capital 
theory. 
A number of studies (e.g. Booth et al., 1999; Battu et al., 2002) find a high 
impact of the employment history on the survival probability.19  Compared with 
the reference group of employees who changed from one employer to another, all 
other employees exhibit significantly shorter durations over the whole observed 
distribution.  This is the expected result according to matching theory.  
Moreover, the effect decreases over time, which is also in line with matching 
theory.  The prediction that recalls to the previous employer result in longer job 
duration is, however, not borne out by the data.  In fact, recalls end earlier than 
all other employment spells.  Unobserved match-specific heterogeneity, such as 
the seasonal nature of some employment relationships, is probably responsible 
for the tendency towards repeated short-term jobs.  Finally, the impact of 
employment history is only little influenced by wages. 
 
                                              
19  These coefficients must be interpreted carefully because previous employment states could be 
correlated with unobserved individual characteristics.  However, for the understanding of the 
determinants leading to heterogeneous job durations, employment history provides highly valuable 
information that should not be dismissed.  
 20
Figure 5: Estimation results of employment history (wages included)  
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The impact of entry wages 
Figure 6 shows effects of the wage (measured as dummies for log wage brackets) 
on job durations.  Wages refer to the first year during which an employment spell 
was observed.  As expected from search theory, job durations are increasing 
monotonically with wages.  However, there is a remarkable asymmetry below 
and above the middle wage bracket.  While the effect is constant over the 
duration distribution for low wages, it is decreasing for the high wage categories 
and becomes insignificant for the 0.6 quantile.  Some part of this difference may 
be explained by different wage trajectories depending on entry wages.  An 
employee who starts with a low wage is unlikely to move up the wage 
distribution, while a worker with a high entry wage may be on a constant or a 
rising wage trajectory, depending on the specific capital accumulated on the job.  
In the second case, the effect of initial wages on current job duration is 
attenuated. 
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Figure 6: Estimation results of entry wages 
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6 Conclusions 
 
In this study, we have analyzed the effects of individual and firm characteristics 
on job durations using censored quantile regression.  The estimation procedure 
allows us to distinguish between the impact of observed characteristics on short 
and long job durations.  Whereas predictions concerning the average effects of 
observable characteristics on job durations are often similar according to 
different theories, the expected impact at different points of the duration 
distribution varies.  We use this fact to investigate whether we can differentiate 
between approaches such as search and job matching theory, human capital 
theory and dual labor markets.  In addition, the comparison between models with 
and without entry wages gives some interesting insights into potential biases of 
the estimators.  Furthermore, the linked employer-employee dataset we use 
allows us to analyze the impact of institutions like works councils and the share 
of fixed-term contracts on individual job stability and its development with 
seniority.   
A number of specific findings deserve to be highlighted. First, firm-
specific coefficients vary markedly with seniority.  For instance, large firms have 
relatively more job stability initially than small firms, possibly since they are 
better known among job applicants. But the effect fades away with duration and 
even becomes negative at higher points in the distribution.  Second, person-
specific coefficients, such as those for age and education, are often constant over 
the duration distribution.  If anything, the effect of education becomes weaker 
with tenure.  Furthermore, variables such as the previous employment state lose 
some of their strength with increasing tenure.  Third, if entry wages are included, 
almost all of the estimated coefficients of individual-specific variables are 
weakened due to the correlation of characteristics and wages. In addition, some 
firm characteristics, such as the share of fixed-term contracts or the presence of a 
works council, turn out to be correlated with entry wages.  Fourth, the 
coefficients of entry wages are positive as expected but decrease towards zero 
over quantiles in high wage groups.  Low wage groups exhibit more or less 
constant effects.  While entry wages may be endogenous to job durations, the 
problem is less serious than for current wages where a reversed causality from 
tenure to wages exists.  The inclusion of entry wages in tenure estimations is, 
therefore, appropriate in order to avoid biases due to omitting the wage 
information. 
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Overall, there is some support from the results for job matching theory.  
Lower exit rates in large firms at the beginning of a match are one example.  The 
decline in the effect of employment history is also consistent with job matching 
theory.  By contrast, little evidence is found for effects of specific human capital.  
In particular, the effect of vocational training on job stability declines at higher 
durations.  So does the provision of further training by the employer.  Both 
results are in contrast to human capital theory if education or training and 
specific human capital are complements. 
The impact of a works council on job durations is high and significant as 
expected.  It unfolds relatively slowly over the employment spell, suggesting that 
works councils’ activities are targeted at workers with high seniority.  Thus, there 
is support for the view that institutions may reinforce labor market segmentation.  
Unexpectedly, the share of fixed-term contracts has a positive but decreasing 
impact on job durations.    Further research with data having information on the 
contract type at the individual level is required to shed more light on this result.  
It would also be interesting to have more detailed information on other personnel 
policies. 
Although the empirical analysis of search, matching and human capital 
theory is still an issue for future research, this study shows that quantile 
regression can be a helpful instrument in this context, even if our data stretches 
only over a relatively short period of time.  A similar application with a longer 
observation period could offer additional insights into the determination of job 
durations.  It could also be helpful for addressing issues such as the changes in 
job stability over time of the impact of the business cycle on job durations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Means and standard deviations of covariates 
 Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev.
Firm-specific Individual-specific   
Bargaining Education  
Works council .92 .27 Secondary school .16 .36
Sector coll.  agreement .80 .40 A-level .06 .23
Firm collective agreement .15 .36 Vocational training and A-levels .06 .24
Further training: yes/no .96 .20 Vocational training .49 .50
Investments in ICT .81 .40 University .23 .42
Share of FTC 6.76 14.65 Job position  
Firm-size Blue collar unskilled .36 .48
<100 Blue collar skilled .16 .37
100-199 .05 .22 White collar .41 .49
200-299 .06 .24 Master craftsman .01 .08
300-499 .08 .27 Part-time .06 .24
500-999 .12 .33 Age  
≥ 1000 .62 .49 25-29 .35 .48
Sector 30-34 .28 .45
Insurance, credit .07 .25 35-39 .17 .37
Transport, communication .05 .21 40-44 .10 .31
Trade, repair .08 .27 45-52 .10 .29
Construction .07 .25 Profession  
Mining, energy, water .02 .14 Production .40 .49
Finish of raw materials .26 .44 Technical .13 .34
Capital goods .21 .41 Services .46 .50
Consumer goods .08 .28 Others .01 .11
Services for firms .04 .20 Previous Employment status  
Other services .08 .28 Job-to-job change .49 .50
Non-profit organization .03 .16 Unemployment .28 .45
Regional authorities, social 
insurances .02 .13 Non-empl.  ≤ 1 year .04 .19
Country   Non-empl.  > 1 year .10 .30
Berlin .07 .26 First employment .05 .23
Schleswig-Holstein .02 .15 Recall .04 .19
Hamburg .07 .25 Log Wage  
Lower Saxony .07 .25 < 4 .04 .19
Bremen .03 .16 4.0-4.25 .03 .16
North Rhine-Westphalia .30 .46 4.25-4.5 .06 .24
Hesse .07 .25 4.5-4.75 .17 .37
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saarland .05 .21 4.75-5.0 .27 .44
Baden-Württemberg .12 .33 5.0-5.25 .21 .41
Bavaria .21 .41 5.25-5.5 .12 .33
 5.5-5.75 .06 .24
 5.75-6.0 .03 .17
 ≥ 6.0 .02 .15
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Table A2: Estimation results with wages 
 Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.2 Quantile 0.3 Quantile 0.4 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.6 
 Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up 
Firm characteristics                   
Works council 0.18 0.04 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.46 0.35 0.22 0.48 0.49 0.36 0.62 0.47 0.35 0.59 0.56 0.38 0.74 
Sector coll.  agreement -0.16 -0.27 -0.05 -0.10 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 -0.21 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.03 -0.14 0.09 
Firm collective 
agreement -0.31 -0.45 -0.16 -0.24 -0.35 -0.12 -0.28 -0.40 -0.15 -0.18 -0.30 -0.06 -0.24 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.26 0.03 
Further training 0.38 0.21 0.55 0.45 0.27 0.63 0.42 0.25 0.59 0.52 0.35 0.68 0.07 -0.10 0.24 0.19 -0.04 0.42 
Investments in ICT -0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.15 0.00 -0.11 -0.17 -0.04 
Share of FTC 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
100-199 -0.20 -0.41 0.01 -0.20 -0.38 -0.02 -0.36 -0.54 -0.19 -0.24 -0.41 -0.06 -0.17 -0.33 0.00 -0.28 -0.51 -0.05 
200-299 0.02 -0.16 0.20 -0.23 -0.41 -0.04 -0.22 -0.41 -0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.21 0.12 -0.03 0.28 0.06 -0.17 0.28 
300-499 0.12 -0.07 0.31 -0.05 -0.24 0.13 -0.09 -0.25 0.06 -0.19 -0.34 -0.04 -0.25 -0.40 -0.09 -0.23 -0.49 0.02 
500-999 0.41 0.24 0.59 0.15 -0.03 0.32 -0.04 -0.19 0.12 -0.25 -0.40 -0.10 -0.43 -0.58 -0.27 -0.76 -0.99 -0.54 
≥ 1000 0.77 0.62 0.92 0.51 0.35 0.67 0.30 0.16 0.45 -0.04 -0.18 0.10 -0.36 -0.50 -0.23 -0.85 -1.07 -0.64 
Sector Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Individual 
characteristics                   
Secondary school -0.45 -0.57 -0.34 -0.39 -0.48 -0.30 -0.38 -0.46 -0.29 -0.36 -0.43 -0.29 -0.26 -0.35 -0.18 -0.13 -0.21 -0.04 
A-levels -1.08 -1.23 -0.92 -1.14 -1.26 -1.02 -1.05 -1.19 -0.90 -1.02 -1.15 -0.89 -0.91 -1.05 -0.76 -0.87 -1.00 -0.74 
Voc.  training and A-
levels -0.45 -0.57 -0.32 -0.43 -0.54 -0.32 -0.45 -0.55 -0.35 -0.46 -0.55 -0.36 -0.35 -0.45 -0.25 -0.28 -0.39 -0.16 
Universitv -0.16 -0.25 -0.08 -0.18 -0.24 -0.11 -0.22 -0.29 -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.14 
Blue collar skilled 0.28 0.15 0.41 0.26 0.18 0.33 0.17 0.10 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.25 0.16 0.34 0.32 0.21 0.42 
White collar 0.38 0.25 0.51 0.16 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.10 0.28 0.24 0.14 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.44 0.21 0.09 0.33 
Master craftsman 0.09 -0.19 0.36 -0.17 -0.50 0.17 0.02 -0.21 0.25 0.50 -0.04 1.04 0.75 0.40 1.11 0.49 0.07 0.91 
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Table A2 continued…                
Part-time  0.59 0.44 0.75 0.49 0.37 0.62 0.51 0.38 0.64 0.58 0.45 0.71 0.65 0.52 0.77 0.56 0.42 0.70 
Age 30-34 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.16 
Age 35-39 0.18 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.26 
Age 40-44 0.27 0.17 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.30 0.22 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.15 0.36 
Age 45-52 0.20 0.09 0.31 0.25 0.17 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.19 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.29 
Occupation Yes   Yes         Yes   Yes   
Origin state                   
Unemployment -0.58 -0.66 -0.50 -0.59 -0.65 -0.52 -0.59 -0.64 -0.53 -0.55 -0.60 -0.49 -0.45 -0.52 -0.39 -0.40 -0.46 -0.34 
Non-empl.  ≤ 1 year -0.84 -1.05 -0.63 -0.87 -1.02 -0.71 -0.88 -1.01 -0.74 -0.74 -0.87 -0.61 -0.65 -0.78 -0.52 -0.57 -0.70 -0.44 
Non-empl.  > 1 year -0.74 -0.86 -0.63 -0.64 -0.72 -0.56 -0.64 -0.72 -0.56 -0.54 -0.62 -0.46 -0.48 -0.56 -0.40 -0.37 -0.46 -0.29 
First employment -0.41 -0.57 -0.24 -0.44 -0.53 -0.34 -0.45 -0.56 -0.34 -0.40 -0.52 -0.28 -0.28 -0.40 -0.15 -0.12 -0.26 0.01 
Recall -1.25 -1.43 -1.06 -1.12 -1.28 -0.97 -1.14 -1.28 -1.00 -1.01 -1.15 -0.88 -0.93 -1.07 -0.79 -0.81 -0.95 -0.66 
Others                   
Year 1996 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.06 
Constant 4.28 3.83 4.72 4.85 4.50 5.19 5.06 4.73 5.40 4.73 4.39 5.08 5.58 5.24 5.93 6.05 5.53 6.57 
States Yes   Yes         Yes   Yes   
Min.  sum of deviations 15222.76 22131.38 25002.75 24497.27 20806.83 16525.02 
# of observations 31504 29807 26805 23385 19321 16129 
Convergence  Yes   No   No   No   No   No  
Note: Confidence intervals on the 5 %-level are shown in the second and third columns. 
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Table A3: Estimation results without wages 
 Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.2 Quantile 0.3 Quantile 0.4 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.6 
 Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up Coef low up 
Firm characteristics                   
Works council 0.37 0.21 0.53 0.39 0.23 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.67 0.59 0.47 0.71 0.79 0.65 0.93 1.03 0.89 1.18 
Sector coll.  agreement -0.14 -0.29 0.00 -0.06 -0.18 0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.20 -0.03 -0.15 0.09 -0.09 -0.21 0.03 
Firm collective 
agreement -0.26 -0.44 -0.08 -0.23 -0.37 -0.09 -0.25 -0.38 -0.13 -0.20 -0.33 -0.07 -0.45 -0.59 -0.30 -0.25 -0.41 -0.09 
Further training 0.31 0.10 0.51 0.42 0.25 0.60 0.39 0.22 0.57 0.53 0.37 0.70 0.11 -0.09 0.31 0.18 -0.04 0.40 
Investments in ICT -0.06 -0.15 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 -0.13 -0.21 -0.05 -0.17 -0.25 -0.09 
Share of FTC 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100-199 -0.17 -0.40 0.06 -0.26 -0.44 -0.07 -0.35 -0.54 -0.17 -0.33 -0.50 -0.17 -0.41 -0.58 -0.23 -0.35 -0.55 -0.16 
200-299 -0.01 -0.23 0.20 -0.20 -0.40 -0.01 -0.14 -0.32 0.04 0.06 -0.12 0.24 0.13 -0.03 0.29 0.10 -0.09 0.29 
300-499 0.12 -0.08 0.32 -0.05 -0.25 0.15 -0.01 -0.16 0.15 -0.06 -0.22 0.10 -0.44 -0.60 -0.27 -0.26 -0.47 -0.05 
500-999 0.42 0.23 0.61 0.17 -0.01 0.35 0.00 -0.16 0.15 -0.31 -0.45 -0.17 -0.73 -0.88 -0.58 -0.89 -1.08 -0.70 
≥ 1000 0.86 0.68 1.05 0.59 0.42 0.76 0.42 0.27 0.56 0.04 -0.09 0.17 -0.55 -0.68 -0.41 -0.95 -1.11 -0.78 
Sector Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Individual 
characteristics                   
Secondary school -0.59 -0.70 -0.48 -0.50 -0.60 -0.40 -0.51 -0.60 -0.43 -0.41 -0.49 -0.33 -0.35 -0.43 -0.26 -0.16 -0.25 -0.07 
A-levels -1.18 -1.32 -1.03 -1.24 -1.38 -1.11 -1.22 -1.35 -1.09 -1.22 -1.34 -1.10 -1.06 -1.19 -0.92 -0.84 -0.98 -0.69 
Voc.  training and A-
levels -0.32 -0.45 -0.20 -0.35 -0.47 -0.23 -0.36 -0.47 -0.26 -0.36 -0.45 -0.26 -0.26 -0.39 -0.13 -0.20 -0.32 -0.08 
Universitv -0.01 -0.09 0.07 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.24 
Blue collar skilled 0.40 0.27 0.52 0.43 0.33 0.52 0.29 0.21 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.60 0.50 0.39 0.61 
White collar 0.67 0.55 0.80 0.64 0.54 0.73 0.60 0.50 0.69 0.52 0.42 0.61 0.67 0.56 0.77 0.52 0.41 0.64 
Master craftsman 0.47 0.17 0.76 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.46 0.11 0.82 0.85 0.45 1.26 1.29 0.96 1.62 0.76 0.26 1.25 
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Table A3 continued…                
Part-time  0.29 0.12 0.46 0.21 0.08 0.34 0.14 0.01 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.37 0.33 0.21 0.45 0.17 0.04 0.30 
Age 30-34 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.18 
Age 35-39 0.35 0.25 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.20 0.13 0.27 
Age 40-44 0.45 0.35 0.55 0.49 0.41 0.58 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.23 0.40 0.23 0.14 0.32 
Age 45-52 0.42 0.31 0.52 0.40 0.31 0.49 0.34 0.26 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.34 0.18 0.08 0.28 
Occupation Yes   Yes         Yes   Yes   
Origin state                   
Unemployment -0.73 -0.82 -0.65 -0.83 -0.91 -0.76 -0.85 -0.91 -0.78 -0.72 -0.78 -0.66 -0.56 -0.62 -0.49 -0.45 -0.53 -0.38 
Non-empl.  ≤ 1 year -1.00 -1.17 -0.83 -1.07 -1.24 -0.91 -1.05 -1.20 -0.90 -0.89 -1.03 -0.75 -0.70 -0.87 -0.53 -0.56 -0.72 -0.40 
Non-empl.  > 1 year -0.84 -0.95 -0.72 -0.93 -1.03 -0.83 -0.88 -0.97 -0.79 -0.70 -0.79 -0.62 -0.51 -0.59 -0.43 -0.39 -0.47 -0.31 
First employment -0.59 -0.73 -0.45 -0.69 -0.81 -0.57 -0.68 -0.79 -0.57 -0.62 -0.74 -0.51 -0.38 -0.49 -0.26 -0.16 -0.28 -0.04 
Recall -1.19 -1.34 -1.04 -1.32 -1.47 -1.17 -1.31 -1.47 -1.16 -1.22 -1.35 -1.09 -1.02 -1.16 -0.87 -0.85 -1.01 -0.69 
Others                   
Year 1996 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.18 
Constant 3.20 2.79 3.61 3.82 3.43 4.20 4.10 3.72 4.48 4.33 3.96 4.69 4.41 4.00 4.81 4.06 3.62 4.49 
States Yes   Yes         Yes   Yes   
Min.  sum of deviations 15739 22983 25998 25348 20553 15905 
# of observations 31586 29750 27003 23763 19039 15698 
Convergence  Yes   No   No   No   No   No  
Note: Confidence intervals on the 5%-level are shown in the second and third columns. 
 
